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DICTA

CASE COMMENTS

April, 1954

I

NEGLIGENCE: CLARK V. THE . JOSLIN DRY GOODS
COMPANY.' The plaintiff in error, Kittie Clark, brought action
for injuries sustained in a fall upon the sidewalk in front of defendant, Joslin's store. She alleged that her injuries were proximately caused by defendant's negligent manner of window washing. This alleged negligence consisted of permitting water to collect
on the sidewalk during this operation. At the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence the case was taken from the jury and judgment
entered for defendant. Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court
of Colorado the decision of the lower court was affirmed. The
grounds upon which the affirmance was based being a lack of any
evidence of negligence upon the part of the defendant, the obvious
inference is that either plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her fall or the mishap was an unavoidable accident.
The court's reference to and quotation from Garbanativ. City of
Durango,2 indicates that the prior and not the later accounted for,
in the eyes of the court, the plaintiff's injury. In either event the
decision is completely orthodox in that regard.
The interesting feature of the opinion is the following language by the court:
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that
the window washing being done on the morning of the
accident, was conducted in other than the usual and customary manner of performing such task.
From this statement it appears that the court is considering evidence of custom and usage without first requiring that the existence
of the custom and usage be established. It is to be noted that the
defendant had put on no evidence. It seems inconceivable that
the plaintiff would offer evidence of the custom and usage in the
trade and thus defeat herself. Apparently, then, either Colorado
does not require any evidence of custom and usage to establish
this defense to alleged negligence or our Supreme Court will take
judicial notice of accepted methods of window washing. In either
alternative this would, indeed, appear to be strange law.
EDWARD L. TRUE.
JUDGMENTS: A CUSTODIAL ORDER IS NOT A FINAL
JUDGMENT. Where there is a right there should be a remedy;
but apparently this is not always true.
In the recent case of Miller v. Miller - the Supreme Court of
Colorado disregarded one of the most fundamental principles of
of procedural due process, the right of judicial review.
The Supreme Court held that where a child becomes a ward
Colo.
-, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 2, p. 37
30 Colo. 358, 70 P. 686.
:'Colo. -,
(1953-54) C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
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of a county court by virtue of a divorce action, the court has continuing jurisdiction and a custodial order is not a final judgment
which can be appealed.
Chapter 46, section 165, '35 C.S.A., provides that "appeals
may be taken to the district court of the same county, from all
final judgments and decrees of the county court, except judgments
by confession, by any person aggrieved by any such final judgment
or decree." How should the words "final decree" be interpreted?
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a judgment awarding
temporary alimony is final in the sense that it may be reviewed
from the Supreme Court when rendered in a
by writ of error
4
divorce action.
The words "final judgment," as used in the Rules of Civil
Procedure governing writs of error and as used in the statute governing appeals from the county court to the district court, apparently do not have the same meaning. There should be no distinction between an order granting temporary alimony and an order
governing the custody of children so far as finality of judgment
is concerned.
If Colorado continues to require a greater degree of finality in
a judgment to appeal to the district court than is required for a
writ of error from the Supreme Court, then an aggrieved parent
is without an effective remedy.
LOREN PARRAGUIRRE

OPINIONS OF COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES
OPINION NO. 1
(Adopted July 31, 1953)
The Committee has been asked to pass upon the propriety of
the following language used by an attorney on business cards,
letter-heads, and envelopes:
(Lawyer's name)
Attorney at Law-Certified Public Accountant
(Lawyer's address)
Attention is called to the following language in Opinion No.
272 of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the
American Bar Association:
We are all confident that a lawyer could not, as a
practical matter, carry on an independent accounting business from his law office without violating Canon 27.
The Committee all agree that a lawyer, who is also
a C.P.A. may perform what are primarily accounting serv'Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133, 10 P. 657 (1886).
Miller v. Miller, 78 Colo. 376, 241 P. 1112 (1925).
Tedman v. Tedman, 78 Colo. 57, 239 P. 877 (1925).
Hultquist v. Hultquist, 77 Colo. 260, 236 P. 777 (1925),
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ices, as an incident to his law practice, without violating
our Canons. We are also agreed that he may not properly
hold himself out as practicing accounting at the same office as that in which he practices law....
The Committee is in agreement with the language above quoted
and considers it controlling.

OPINION NO. 2
(Adopted July 31, 1953)
The Committee has been asked to consider the propriety of
using the imprint "Tax Expert" on the office door and business
cards and other stationery used by an attorney.
The Committee is of the opinion that such usage is improper
and that Opinion No. 175 of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances of the American Bar Association is controlling.
This Opinion reads in part as follows:
We are of the opinion that it is not permissible to include in a simple professional card language indicating
that the lawyer restricts his practice to any particular
class of work not generally recognized as a specialty. Obvious examples of the latter are "Admiralty" and "Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights." Any class of work which
the average lawyer is equipped and willing to handle cannot be said to be a specialty despite the fact that a lawyer
may restrict himself to such a class of work and acquires
an unusual degree of proficiency and experience in handling the same. Any specification of particular types of work
necessarily carries an inference that unusual ability or experience is asserted and consequently noticed or advertised. The fact that the motive may be to obviate the necessity of refusing other types of work does not avoid the
inference....

ATTENTION LAWYERS
Attorney, 28, married, LL.B., LL.M. -1 year local trust
department experience, desires position in a low office or firm.
HA 4-3107, 411O2 Upham, Wheatridge.

